33samurai (33samurai) wrote,
33samurai
33samurai

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Официальное начало киберпанка.

ВС США разродились вот такой вот замечательной брошюркой, призванной определить политику Армии на ближайшее будущее. Документ заслуживает полного прочтения, потому как это ничто иное как описание боевых действий в условиях того самого киберпанка, на которые мы уже порядком насмотрелись и начитались, но которые теперь рассматриваются на самом высоком уровне как реальность современного поля боя. Тем, кому сложно читать подобные вещи, можно просто посмотреть ГиТС или Эплсид.



The central idea of TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, operational adaptability, depends fundamentally on educating and developing leaders capable of understanding the situation in depth, critically assessing the situation, and adapting actions to seize and retain the initiative. Leaders must direct efforts to fight for information, consolidate gains, and transition between tasks and operations to ensure progress toward achieving policy goals and strategic objectives. Accomplishing the mission will demand leaders capable of integrating their efforts with a broad range of partners in complex environments and among diverse populations. Army forces must be designed to fight for information and develop the situation in close contact with the enemy and civilian populations. Forces must also be capable both of rapid operations over extended distances (such as forcible entry operations and offensive operations) and capable of sustaining operations over time and across wide areas. The uncertainty and complexity of future operations will demand forces that can operate in a decentralized manner consistent with the concept of mission command. Decentralized operations will require combined arms capabilities and access to joint capabilities at low levels. Close combat with the enemy and operations in and among the population will place extraordinary physical, moral, and psychological demands on Soldiers and small units. The Army must build cohesive teams and train, educate, and prepare Soldiers to cope with those demands and accomplish the mission.

http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-3-0.pdf


Избранные цитаты.

Threat capabilities will also improve. For example, enemy forces will use complex and urban terrain to avoid U.S. and allied surveillance capabilities while emerging technologies will permit enemy forces to reduce equipment signatures. Future adversaries will use commercial off-the-shelf capabilities (to include information technology) to construct a well-organized, dispersed force capable of complex operations. Additionally, enemy forces will retain access to the network and recruit “technological nomads”—digitally savvy individuals who might use active and passive techniques to attack networks leading to selective degradation of command and control, logistics, and governance information systems.
***
Technological advantage will remain a vital component of military effectiveness. The Army must continue to develop countermeasures to future threat capabilities and pursue technological opportunities. Enemies and adversaries, however, will counter technological advantages through emulation, adaptation, or evasion. It is because of this continuous interaction that the Army must take an evolutionary, rather than revolutionary or “leap ahead,” approach to force development. Understanding how human beings apply technology will continue to be more important than the technologies themselves.
***
Army forces must be prepared to defeat what some have described as hybrid enemies: both hostile states and nonstate enemies that combine a broad range of weapons capabilities and regular, irregular, and terrorist tactics; and continuously adapt to avoid U.S. strengths and attack what they perceive as weaknesses.
***
Acting. Army forces must be capable of taking action to gain visibility of enemy organizations and to understand how those organizations and our forces interact with the environment, including the population.
Since enemy forces will use countermeasures such as dispersion, concealment, deception, and intermingling with the population to limit the ability of the joint force to develop the situation out of contact, Army forces will have to fight for information. Fighting for information begins with effective reconnaissance and intelligence collection to fill in the gaps in commanders’ understanding of the situation. Fighting for information will require combined arms capabilities, access to joint capabilities, specialized training, and the employment of appropriate combinations of manned and unmanned air and ground systems. Learning about the enemy and the environment will require forces to see, fight, and learn across the depth and breadth of the area of operations. Acting may entail placing something of value to the enemy at risk to force the enemy to reveal intentions. Army forces must gain and maintain contact with the enemy to observe, assess, and interpret enemy reactions and the ensuing opportunities or threats to friendly forces, populations, or the mission.
***
Because Army forces are increasingly dependent on electro-magnetic, computer network, and space-based capabilities and because those conduits of information are converging, exerting technical influence will require forces that are prepared to fight and win on an emerging “cyber-electromagnetic battleground.” Because technology that effects how information moves changes so rapidly, the Army must evaluate continuously what competencies and capabilities are required to gain, protect, and exploit advantages in highly contested cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrums. Army forces, as part of joint and interagency teams, must contribute to effective offensive and defensive operations to protect friendly information and communications and disrupt the enemy’s ability to move and manipulate information. The Army must also avoid creating single points of failure to retain the ability to “fight through” disruptions or the interruption of communications through use of alternate digital, analog, or manual means, methods, and pathways.
***
Emerging technological capabilities associated with the network (i.e., global information grid, LandWarNet, collection platforms, fusion and dissemination capabilities through the timely horizontal and vertical flow of information) can enable mission command if systems improve interoperability, help synthesize information into knowledge, operate in austere environments and on the move, and provide shared situational understanding to the lowest possible levels. The sheer amount of information available, the limits of human cognition, and the presence of contradictory or false information, however, will prevent the network, in and of itself, from delivering information superiority. The Army must design forces and educate leaders to take advantage of network capabilities while ensuring that those forces and leaders are capable of conducting operations consistent with the concept of mission command.
***
Decentralized operations place a premium on disciplined, confident small units that can integrate joint capabilities and fight together as combined arms teams. Leaders must prepare their units to fight and adapt under conditions of uncertainty and, during the conduct of operations, must also ensure moral conduct and make critical time-sensitive decisions under pressure. Conducting effective decentralized operations will require a high degree of unit cohesion developed through tough, realistic training and shared operational experience. The Army must refine its capability to adapt training to the mission, threat, or operational environment changes while ensuring that individual and collective training fosters adaptability, initiative, and confidence.
***
Provide mobile protected firepower throughout the force. Because of technological limitations and enemy countermeasures, units will have to operate under conditions of uncertainty in and among the populace, fight for information, conduct area security and decentralized operations over large areas, develop the situation through action, and adapt continuously to changing situations. Units will, therefore, require the manpower, assured
mobility assets, firepower (lethality), and protection to close with the enemy. Mobile protected firepower must deliver precise lethal and nonlethal effects and be interoperable with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners and permit soldiers to use force with discrimination when the enemy is operating in and among the people. Integrated battle command systems will support mobile protected firepower in a network that provides adequate communications and situational awareness to both mounted and dismounted personnel in complex terrain.
***
Develop protected general purpose vehicles. The rise--and ready availability--of advanced technology and cheap improvised explosive devices provide the greatest challenge to future force movement. Adversaries will target the U.S. where it is predictable. Urbanization will canalize Army forces and make the forces vulnerable. The improvised explosive device threat has led to an increased demand for mobile protected firepower and combat engineers to cover assured mobility. Land forces need general purpose vehicles broadly suited to different types of terrain and threats, yet the demands of current operations are resulting in a proliferation of increasingly specialized vehicles, leading to mixed fleets which do not have broad utility. Force protection considerations will continue to constrain the discretion of commanders in taking risks as they strive to balance the requirements of conducting operations with the protection of troops – without becoming risk averse.
***
Provide light forces with protected mobility. Specific attention should be given to the protection of light forces. They have, until now, been viewed as discretionary users of protected mobility vehicles, as it has been assumed that providing them with heavier vehicles might make them unable to conduct the full range of light force tasks. Light forces will need access to protected mobile vehicles and retain mission functionality with a degraded or interrupted network. These vehicles should also have sufficient weapons capability to deliver rapid, accurate, lethal, overwhelming direct fire against enemy infantry under all conditions of battle. Protected mobility vehicles should have capabilities to close with and eliminate the threat by synchronizing tactical reconnaissance (manned and unmanned), maneuver, fires, protection, close combat assault, and sustainment. Although this may constrain their ability to operate with a light footprint, it is likely to be mandated in order to provide sufficient levels of protection for deployed soldiers and civilians. This trend may also enhance the ability of light forces to assume wider roles.
***
Security force assistance (improving indigenous security and governance institutions and capabilities) is essential to stability operations, countering irregular threats, preventing conflicts, and facilitating security transitions. Security force assistance consists of providing indigenous units and institutions with the equipment, supporting logistics, infrastructure, training, and education necessary to improve security and foster cooperation in future operations.
***
Это первый документ такого рода в котором не упоминается бронетанковый апокалипсис как основа для модели войны.



Tags: modern_war
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